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As I have previously stated, the training of a unit or formation is never completed. For instance neither G.O.C. First Canadian Division, nor myself, would admit that First Canadian Division which has trained vigorously for two years, and elements of which have partaken in actual operations, is fit to meet enemy as we would wish it. There is always room for improv ment. On the other hand, as a general statement, with information at my disposal concerning units of Force "C" and knowing professional ability and character of Commanding Officer, Brigadier Lawson, I would say that Force "C" was certainly fit to meet an attacking force, even in superior numbers, and to give a fine account of itself by December 8, 1941.
A telegram from Colonel Sutcliffe, dated December 22, lends confirmation to General Crerar's judgment. Colonel Sutcliffe, who was at this time evidently in command following the death of Brigadier Lawson and Colonel Hennessy, says:-
"Troops have done magnificent work. Spirit excellent."
After reviewing in light of the evidence the considerations which it was the duty of General Crerar to weigh, I arrive at a clear opinion that I could not justify a declaration that he was wrong in his decision to recommend the selection of these two battalions. Another Chief of the General Staff in the same circumstances might perhaps not unreasonably have take another view. But I think the balance of practical considerations favoured the course actually taken. There is, therefore, no good ground for imputing to General Crerar, in the matter of the selection of the battalions to compose the expeditionary force, any error in judgment, much less any dereliction of duty.
SECTION IV-ADDITIONS TO THE STRENGTH OF THE TWO
BATTALIONS
The higher rifle establishment for a Canadian infantry battalion provides for 34 officers and 773 other ranks-a total of 807 for all ranks. The "first reinforcements" for a battalion consist of 6 officers and 150 other ranks—a total of 156 for all ranks. Thus, a battalion with its "first reinforcements" comprises 40 officers and 923 other ranks-a total complement of 963.
"First reinforcements" for a battalion in the field are usually left at the battalion depot behind the lines, and do not immediately become part of the fighting strength of the unit. They are intended to be available to make good the losses that the battalion may suffer from casualties and illness. When a battalion proceeds overseas, particularly to a station as far distant as Hong Kong, it frequently happens that the "first reinforcements" accompany the unit. Early in the preparation of the Hong Kong expedition, the question arose whether "first reinforcements" should accompany the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers to Hong Kong. An inquiry was directed, through Canadian Military Headquarters in London, to the War Office, and the advice was received that the Canadian battalions should take with them their "first reinforcements." It was accordingly necessary to add a number of officers and men to both units.
A further inquiry was sent by National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa to the War Office respecting medical categories. The War Office replied that men could be taken down to and including the Canadian medical category C2. In fact, the medical rating of those included in the force did not go below B1 and may not have included any men even in that mategory. But the statement of acceptable medical categories from the War Office is not with- out significance as indicating the view of the War Office as to the nature of the task that was being undertaken. This statement points to an expectation at the War Office that the Canadian reinforcements would be employed in garrison duties.
At the time of selection, the Royal Rifles were slightly over strength. The Winnipeg Grenadiers, who had just returned from the West Indies, were under full strength by more than 100 men. To bring both battalions up to strength 136 men were required, in addition to 300 for first reinforcements. In obtaining these men there were two conditioning factors--rapidity and secrecy. Between the time the battalions were warned for service overseas (on October 9) and the time the expedition sailed (on October 27) there was an interval of only eighteen days, less embarkation leave, in which every one of these volunteers must be recruited, medically examined, completely re-outfitted and transported to Vancouver. The necessity for maintaining the most complete secrecy strictly limited the field of recruiting. Only the officers commanding the two battalions knew that their destination was Hong Kong. To aid in preserving this secrecy, it was necessary to obtain recruits from as few localities as possible.
The men added to the strength of the two battalions volunteers for service, knowing only that the units had been selected for active service overseas in a semi-tropical country. The policy of taking only volunteers was deliberately adopted. Although all men in the active army had enlisted for service overseas and the Government, accordingly, had legal power to send them overseas with- out asking their consent, yet, as has already been explained, when a man enlists in the Canadian army he enlists in a particular unit and there is a convention that he is not transferred to another without his consent, in the 35
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